Coping with the asylum challenge: tightening and streamlining policies in Western Europe by Bernhard, Laurent & Kaufmann, David
1 
Coping with the asylum challenge: Tightening and streamlining policies in Western 
Europe 
 
Laurent Bernhard, University of Lausanne, FORS, Géopolis, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland, 
laurent.bernhard@fors.unil.ch 
David Kaufmann, University of Bern, Center of Competence of Public Management, 
Schanzeneckstrasse 1, 3001 Bern, Switzerland, david.kaufmann@kpm.unibe.ch 
Abstract 
To cope with the challenges posed by growing numbers of asylum seekers, Western European 
countries have relied on tightening policies over the last decades. We propose to complement 
this traditional and one-dimensional view by highlighting the importance of encompassing 
streamlining policies that aim to enhance the efficiency of national asylum systems through 
procedural accelerations and structural reforms. We argue that political conflicts over tightening 
and streamlining policies follow different logics. While it is hypothesised that the level of 
support for the former increases the more to the right a given actor position itself, approval for 
the latter is expected to decline with the degree of ideological extremity on the left-right axis. 
The empirical case relies on structured elite interviews conducted with the major political 
organisations involved in a referendum on the urgent modifications of the Swiss asylum law in 
2013. Our quantitative findings tend to support our hypotheses. 
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Introduction 
A record number of people currently suffer from fleeing their homes and seeking refuge. By 
the end of 2015, the UNHCR (2016) reported that there were 65.3 million refugees, internally 
displaced people and asylum seekers; the highest numbers reported since World War II. Within 
a year, this number rose by 12.4 million. In the Western part of the world, OECD countries 
received around 1.65 million asylum applications in 2015 (OECD 2016). The majority of 
applications were filed on the European continent where countries struggled with registering, 
hosting and determining the status of almost 1.3 million asylum seekers in 2016 (Eurostat 
2017). The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ that is currently challenging European governments is not 
just caused by high numbers of asylum-seekers, but also by the failure of European 
governments to coordinate with each other in order to formulate viable political solutions to 
this humanitarian emergency (Scipioni forthcoming; Zaun 2017). 
To cope with rising numbers of asylum seekers, migration scholars have posited that 
industrialised countries have increasingly relied on tightening policies over the last decades, i.e. 
policies that either limit access to asylum applications or attempt to reduce the attractiveness of 
an asylum destination country (Hatton 2009, 2012; Thielemann and Hobolth 2016). Yet some 
recent comparative studies find a more nuanced picture (Beine et al. 2016; de Haas, Natter, and 
Vezzoli forthcoming; Helbling and Kalkum forthcoming). 
We propose complementing this traditional and one-dimensional view with the idea that 
decision-makers are increasingly relying on so-called streamlining policies. These 
encompassing efficiency-enhancing policies aim to speed up asylum procedures and 
structurally reorganise competences and responsibilities within national asylum systems. While 
the tightening dimension of asylum policies is well established in the academic literature, the 
tendency towards streamlining has been barely addressed so far. This lack of academic attention 
contrasts with recent policy surveys that emphasise the pervasiveness of such reforms. Most 
prominently, in the title of the asylum policy section of its 2013 International Migration 
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Outlook, the OECD (2013, 58) stated that “humanitarian policies are being streamlined and 
there is general trend towards deterrence”. Thus, we contend that both tightening and 
streamlining policies should be taken into consideration in order to obtain a full picture of 
current asylum-related reforms in Europe. 
We empirically look at the conflict structure of asylum reforms with regard to both 
tightening and streamlining policies. To that end, we focus on actor’s positions on written 
policies (Czaika and de Haas 2013).1 We posit that both tightening and streamlining policies 
are disputed among elite actors. We further argue that political organisations respond to these 
two types of policies in systematically different ways by formulating two hypotheses. As to 
tightening, we expect actor preferences to be rooted in the new cultural conflict dimension that 
opposes libertarian and cosmopolitan to authoritarian and nationalist values (Kriesi et al. 2008). 
Our first hypothesis thus predicts that the level of support for tightening policies will increase 
the more to the ideological right a given political actor positions itself. Our second hypothesis 
predicts that the level of support for streamlining policies decreases with the degree of extremity 
on the left-right axis. In other words, we postulate a cross-cutting cleavage to the left-right 
antagonism for streamlining policies. The rationale behind this expectation relates to the fact 
that more extreme actors tend to express fundamental criticism of the asylum regimes that are 
currently available in Western Europe. As a consequence, more radical groups on either side of 
                                                            
1 Czaika and de Haas (2013) introduced a very useful distinction between written policies, policy discourse and 
policy implementation when considering the effectiveness of immigration policies. As outlined in the present 
study’s research design, the policies we selected for our empirical analysis were part of a referendum 
proposition, which gave rise to a nationwide policy debate in Switzerland. Thus, the advantages and 
disadvantages of these policies actually occurred in the framework of a much broader policy discourse. 
However, given that our interview questions narrowly refer to each single policy of the reform, we posit that we 
ultimately examine written policies. 
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the political spectrum are reluctant to support policies that aim to enhance the efficiency of 
national asylum systems in a rather pragmatic manner. 
The empirical analysis is based on structured elite interviews on the so-called 
modifications of the federal asylum law that both chambers of the Swiss Parliament enacted in 
September 2012. This bill presents two crucial advantages from an analytical perspective. First, 
since it contained the same number of tightening as streamlining policies, it can be considered 
to be a balanced reform package. Second, this bill proved to be highly politicised, since it 
subsequently gave rise to a referendum campaign. With respect to streamlining, its high 
saliency makes it much more likely that collective actors of various political stripes have 
already formed coherent preferences about these policies. The empirical findings tend to 
support the two above-mentioned hypotheses. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In section two, we summarise the 
tightening approach in the domain of asylum and introduce our understanding of streamlining 
policies. In section three, we derive our two hypotheses about the conflict structure with respect 
to these two distinct policies. Section four is devoted to the research design. After some 
considerations about the case selection, we describe our data collection strategy and present the 
operationalization of the key variables. The statistical testing of the hypotheses occurs in section 
five. Section 6 reviews the results of the quantitative analysis and addresses its implications and 
limitations. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Over the last decades, the ways in which asylum policies are designed and implemented in 
OECD countries have undergone some important changes. In Europe, the harmonisation 
process has constituted one of the major trends since the beginning of the 21st century (Barbou 
des Places 2004; Toshkov and de Haan 2013). Europeanization led to a convergence of national 
asylum policies, to a formalization of asylum institutions in Southern Eastern European states 
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as well as to an improvement of protection standards (El-Enany and Thielemann 2011; Kaunert 
and Leonard 2012; Zaun 2017). Yet scholars basically agree that asylum policies at the national 
level still play a crucial role (Hatton 2009; Toshkov and de Haan 2013).  
So far, the academic literature tends to view national asylum policies through the prism 
of one single policy approach. Many authors maintain that industrialised countries have adopted 
more restrictive policies, thus gradually abandoning their liberal refugee regimes of the post-
World War II era (Barbou des Places 2004; Cornelius et al. 2004; Hatton 2009, 2012). Recent 
studies that draw on comparative migration policy datasets have detected some more nuanced 
patterns (Beine et al. 2016; de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli forthcoming; Helbling and Kalkum 
forthcoming). 
Beyond tightening policies, we argue that policies concerned with streamlining have 
gained currency in recent years. Asylum authorities all over Western Europe have adopted such 
reforms over the last decades. In the aftermath of the London Resolution of 1992, national 
efforts in the beginning of the 2000s followed an exclusionary logic by targeting asylum seekers 
with ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims. Since the 2010s, the scope of streamlining efforts proved 
to be broader in scope, given that such reforms generally aimed to enhance the efficiency of the 
national asylum systems. 
 
Tightening 
During the Cold War, refugees were met with sympathy in Western countries, since they were 
perceive to share a common rejection of communism, the enemy’s political ideology. This 
sympathy has turned into widespread public contempt and clamour following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Hatton 2012). Popular demands for limiting the number of asylum 
applications have mostly been channelled by parties from the radical right, but also sometimes 
by moderate ones (see Bale 2008 for migration policies in general). This has caused a policy 
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backlash that manifested itself in a decisive tightening all over industrialised countries (Hatton 
2012).  
Basically, there are two types of tightening policies. The first approach consists of 
making access to asylum more difficult, either by impeding the entry of asylum seekers into the 
territory of a destination country, or by restricting access to the refugee status determination 
process (Hatton 2009). The second approach focuses on reducing the attractiveness of asylum 
destinations. Prominent examples of such negative incentives include more restrictive refugee 
status determination rules and tougher welfare benefits and living conditions for asylum 
seekers. The first approach has been shown to be more successful in reducing the numbers of 
asylum applicants than the second one (Hatton 2009). However, policies that aim to limit access 
to the asylum process are highly controversial from legal and moral points of views since all 
asylum seekers are affected, regardless of whether they are in need of protection. 
A number of scholars agree that national asylum policies have become more restrictive 
since the early 1990s (e.g. Hatton 2009; Keogh 2013; Beine et al. 2016). Based on comparative 
migration policy datasets, recent studies have revealed some contradictory patterns, however. 
While Beine et al. (2016) identify a general trend towards restrictive asylum policies, de Haas, 
Natter, and Vezzoli (forthcoming) show that asylum policy liberalizations have strongly 
decelerated since 1989 and have stopped in 2010. The analysis by Helbling and Kalkum 
(forthcoming) concludes that the conditions and the criteria for asylum seekers have become 
more liberal. At the same time, national decision-makers are found to employ more restrictive 
control mechanisms to prevent irregular migrants from entering the country (de Haas, Natter, 
and Vezzoli forthcoming; Helbling and Kalkum forthcoming). Thus, the debate about the 
tightening of asylum policies is not entirely settled yet, especially in Europe. Comparative 
migration policy scholars seem nevertheless to agree that the access to asylum destination 
countries has become more restrictive. 
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Moreover, comparative research has established that the level of restrictiveness of 
asylum regimes is not the decisive factor when it comes to explaining asylum seekers’ 
destination choice. Asylum flows are primarily driven by wars, humanitarian crises, oppression 
in the countries of origin and natural disasters (Schmeidl 1997; Hatton 2009; Thielemann 2012). 
They are also motivated by existing relationships and migrant networks (Havinga and Böcker 
1999; Neumayer 2004; Barthel and Neumayer 2015). However, these crucial determinants 
largely escape the influence of asylum policy-makers (Thielemann 2006, 2012; Czaika and de 
Haas 2013). This large degree of exogeneity explains why tightening policies have proven to 
be rather limited in their effectiveness (Hatton 2009, 209; Thielemann 2012). 
 
Streamlining 
Policy responses for coping with growing numbers of asylum requests have not only revolved 
around tightening. In fact, policies that make the process more efficient are part of the toolbox 
of today’s decision-makers. The OECD (2011, 119) has detected a converging and continuing 
trend towards efficiency-enhancing reforms, notably the acceleration of refugee status 
determination procedures and the reliance on structural reforms. In line with OECD policy 
surveys, we propose calling such encompassing endeavours ‘streamlining reforms’. To our 
knowledge, scholars have so far neglected the study of these policies. We consider streamlining 
reforms to be worth studying, as they currently considerably modify national asylum systems 
by following on a logic that is independent from tightening. 
Admittedly, efficiency-enhancing policies are anything but new in the domain of 
asylum. In line with the sociological literature on organisations, which regards such adjustments 
in policies as constant practices aimed at repairing organisational deficiencies (e.g. Cooper and 
Burrell 1988, Brunsson 2009), Triandafyllidou (2003) showed that newly introduced 
management principles in Italian immigration offices strived for enhanced efficiency but in fact 
led to a practice of factitious efficiency. In a similar vein, Eule’s (2014, 75) compelling study 
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on the practices of German immigration offices found that these organisations constantly 
struggle with problems of inefficiency, and consequently undergo a constant cycle of structural 
failure and reform.  
Another strand of literature focused on the introduction of accelerated procedures in 
Europe (see Oakley 2007 for an overview). Initiated by the so-called London Resolution in 
1992 (Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum), exclusionary 
accelerated procedures were established in European countries in the early 2000s. These 
reforms aimed to quickly process ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims, thus targeting a specific 
category of asylum seekers (Oakley 2007, 3-4; Reneman 2013). By 2005, all EU-15 member 
states, and all 10 new member states that had joined the EU in 2004, had implemented some 
sort of exclusionary accelerated procedures (Oakley 2007, 6-7). The ‘fast-track’ procedure that 
was introduced in the UK at Oakington Immigration Reception Centre in 2000 is probably the 
best-studied case (e.g. Bloch and Schuster 2005, Oakley 2007, Costello 2015). However, due 
to their narrow focus on, these reforms proved to be limited in scope. As we will show, it is 
only since the early 2010s that encompassing streamlining reforms became popular in Europe. 
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between two types of streamlining policies. The 
first approach is concerned with increased efficiency, simplifications and the acceleration of 
refugee status determination procedures, with the aim of preventing or clearing asylum request 
backlogs. Regarding this type of streamlining policies, Oakley (2007, 1) proposed a useful 
distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary practices: “While the main objective of an 
inclusionary accelerated procedure is to speedily grant an individual refugee status, the main 
objective of an exclusionary accelerated procedure is to speedily deny an individual refugee 
status”. The second approach consists of structural reforms designed to re-organise 
competences and responsibilities between agencies and across levels of the political system in 
order to increase the efficiency and flexibility of national asylum systems. Indeed, high 
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volatilities in the number of asylum applications generate a need for either enlarging or 
downsizing asylum-related infrastructures. 
Encompassing streamlining reforms are often inspired by the concept of ‘front-loading’. 
According to this concept, the standard evaluations of asylum cases (e.g. health issues) and 
safeguards for asylum seekers (e.g. legal advice) are implemented from the very beginning of 
the refugee status determination procedure. The promise of ‘front-loading’ is to accelerate 
proceedings by potentially significantly reducing the number of unnecessary appeals due to the 
improved quality of first instance decisions and is therefore meant to be cost-effective in the 
long term (Costello and Hancox 2016). Indeed, shorter waiting periods in the refugee status 
determination procedure increase the probability of refugees’ successful economic integration 
(Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence 2016). 
Most European countries have recently engaged in major asylum reforms that feature 
various types of streamlining policies. The most ambitious reform probably occurred in the 
Netherlands in 2011. In addition to tightening policies, the Dutch parliament decided to 
centralise the country’s refugee status determination procedure by creating four national asylum 
centres. The Dutch asylum law now allows for more preparation time ahead of the asylum 
interview. The objective is to accelerate the subsequent procedural steps and to reduce the 
number of appeals (OECD 2010, 65; OECD 2013, 60). 
Many European countries currently use the example of the Netherlands to reform their 
asylum systems. This will reinforce the trend towards streamlining in the near future. The 
parliaments of France (2014) and Switzerland (2015) have already passed similar laws. The 
French bill, for instance, aimed to reduce the average waiting period for asylum status decisions 
from hitherto more than two years to nine months (OECD 2015, 50). Another example is 
Ireland, where authorities introduced a single protection determination procedure in 2008. All 
protection claims, including claims for both asylum and subsidiary protection, are now 
examined under a single procedure at first instance (OECD 2010, 65). Another comprehensive 
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streamlining reform took place in Greece in 2011. Due to on-going pressure in the country – 
both as a result of its geographical location as a main gate to Europe and the chronically 
malfunctioning of its national system – its parliament passed a new law in order to simplify 
asylum procedures and to create an autonomous agency with decentralised offices (OECD 
2012, 111). 
There are several motivations for streamlining reforms. Given that tightening policies 
have a limited effect on the number of asylum seekers, asylum authorities seem to increasingly 
turn towards streamlining policies, which allow them to have a more direct policy impact. The 
major rationale expressed by national governments is that destination countries can rapidly 
arrive at their capacity limits when faced with growing numbers of asylum applications (Byrne 
2002; Oakley 2007). In the European context, asylum seekers usually pass through a rather 
thorough examination process. This includes asylum interviews, health checks, language 
analysis for determining the country of origin and sometimes even in-depth, as well as on 
ground, investigations of asylum claims. Such refugee status determination systems run the risk 
of rapidly becoming overloaded, not in the least because trained staff is only able to handle a 
limited number of applications in a given period of time. Time delays generate considerable 
additional costs in terms of housing, infrastructure and welfare benefits. In addition, appeals 
against status decisions are more likely to occur in chronically overloaded situations. In 
accordance with this view, the OECD (2013, 58) has identified that a major reason for member 
states to engage in streamlining reforms is to reduce the number of asylum request backlogs 
that have accumulated over the years. 
When confronted with high numbers of asylum requests, European countries are not 
only likely to face major difficulties in treating asylum requests in due time, but also in reaching 
the capacity limits in terms of their asylum infrastructure. This challenge is aggravated by 
backlogs. Such extraordinary situations require flexible ways for supplying additional lodging 
capacities, such as temporary refugee centres, within a short period of time. 
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However, one may also argue that national decision-makers could provide additional resources 
to asylum systems in order to cope with such challenges. Under current circumstances, it might 
be the case that many governments are reluctant to provide enough resources to their asylum 
systems. Due to successful mobilizations by the radical right, rather hostile public opinions 
towards asylum seekers, and growing budgetary constraints, there might be a widespread lack 
of political will and courage to increase asylum capacities in contemporary Europe. 
 
Conflict structures over tightening and streamlining reforms 
In the age of globalisation, asylum policies have become a key issue in Western Europe and are 
characterised by an agitated public, mobilised interest groups and partisan conflict (Freeman 
2006, 238). In the following, we shall set out hypotheses about the conflict structure pertaining 
to tightening and streamlining reforms. As will be elaborated in this section, we posit that 
political actors systematically respond in different ways to these two policies. We expect 
conflicts over tightening to be structured along the classical left-right axis. We argue that these 
preferences are rooted in the new cultural conflict dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008). As a 
consequence, we hypothesise that the amount of support for tightening policies increases the 
more to the right a given political actor positions itself. In contrast, we assert the existence of a 
cross-cutting cleavage to this left-right axis with respect to streamlining reforms. More 
specifically, we state that the degree of approval for streamlining reforms is negatively 
dependent on ideological extremity. In other words, more moderate actors should be more likely 
to favour streamlining policies. 
The following is a theoretical explanation for our first hypothesis. When it comes to 
major political conflicts in contemporary Western Europe, political scientists typically draw a 
distinction between economic and cultural policy dimensions (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; 
Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008). While the former refers to the opposition 
between state interventions and market solutions, the latter contrasts libertarian and 
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cosmopolitan values on one side, with authoritarian and nationalist values on the other side. 
The domain of asylum policies has been associated with the cultural cleavage (Akkerman 
2015). This conflict dimension has become very salient in Western Europe over the last 
decades. Historically, the cultural cleavage had its roots in religious confrontations. However, 
under the impact of secularization, the transformation of class structure and globalisation, this 
conflict dimension has acquired a different meaning. Currently, it refers to an antagonism 
between universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. This conflict has become 
increasingly politicised in Western Europe as a result of mobilisations by the new left and the 
Greens, as well as by the radical right (Bornschier 2010). While the former promoted issues 
such as ecology, participatory democracy and libertarianism, the latter primarily took a stand 
against European integration and advocated for a more restrictive orientation of immigration 
policies, thus decisively contributing to an ethnicisation of politics.In the Western European 
context, the left tends to adhere to cosmopolitan views, the radical right to nationalist ones and 
actors from the moderate right usually take an intermediate stance (Kriesi et al. 2008).  
Given that tightening reforms basically aim to increase the restrictiveness of asylum 
policies, such undertakings are directly linked to the authoritarian/nationalist pole of the new 
cultural conflict dimension. It thus seems obvious to expect that the position on tightening 
policies is directly influenced by the left-right antagonism. More specifically, we hypothesise 
that the more ideologically to the right political actors position themselves, the more likely they 
are to agree on tightening policies. In accordance with this hypothesis, the radical right has 
continuously mobilised for a more restrictive orientation in the recent past, while the left and 
its civil society allies have kept trying to maintain the status quo or strengthen the rights of 
asylum seekers (Czaika and Hobolth 2016). Comparative empirical studies on immigration in 
general (Akkerman 2015; Duncan and Van Hecke 2008; Alonso and da Fonseca 2012), and on 
asylum in particular (Akkerman 2015), have further revealed that moderate parties (such as the 
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Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives and Agrarians) typically position themselves in-
between the radical right and the left. 
As far as streamlining policies are concerned, a different logic is expected to apply. We 
argue that the level of support is negatively dependent on the political actors’ degree of 
extremity on the left-right axis. Put differently, more moderate actors (such as the moderate 
right, the moderate left, religious organisations and public authorities) are more likely to be in 
favour of these policies. The objectives of acceleration and cost-reduction, which are 
fundamental in streamlining reforms, are assumed to be in line with the generally pragmatic 
problem-solving approach favoured by moderate actors in asylum matters. In addition, they 
may support streamlining on the grounds that such procedural reforms do not damage the 
humanitarian principles to which they usually adhere. In particular, these actors may take 
comfort from the fact that procedural improvements do not call into question the liberal asylum 
regime that has been dominant in Western Europe since the aftermath of World War II. These 
considerations may be especially pertinent to humanist actors such as religious organisations 
and charities. 
In contrast, more radical actors on either side of the political spectrum are expected to 
be rather sceptical about streamlining policies. We argue that this is due to the fact that both 
radical groups tend to express fundamental criticism of the current national asylum regimes 
Hence, these actors may be reluctant to support policies that rather pragmatically aim to 
enhance the efficiency of existing national asylum systems by means of procedural 
accelerations and structural reforms. However, depending on the groups at stake, the logic 
behind this opposition is based on entirely different reasons. Typically, actors from the radical 
right believe that only tougher reforms, especially with regard to access of asylum seekers, are 
able to solve existing problems in the domain of asylum. In other words, these actors consider 
streamlining policies to be largely futile. In contrast, the radical left may be sceptical towards 
streamlining because these policies may jeopardise the rights of asylum seekers. These actors 
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may fear that the goal of speeding up asylum procedures leads to inaccurate decision-making 
and that the cutting back of safeguards would be at the expense of asylum seekers. More 
generally, the radical left uses to advocate for comprehensive immigration liberalisations that 
would make the distinction between politically persecuted refugees and economic migrants 
obsolete (see Crawley and Skleparis (2018) for an academic critique about this distinction). 
Taken together, we expect that a conflict that opposes moderate to radical actors should be 
observable with respect to streamlining policies. 
Based on these considerations, we are now equipped to formulate the following two 
hypotheses: 
H1: The level of support for tightening policies increases the more to the right a political actor 
positions itself. 
H2: The level of support for streamlining policies decreases with the degree of extremity on the 
left-right axis. 
 
Research design 
Case selection 
To test our hypotheses in the framework of an illustrative case study, we propose the case of 
the so-called urgent modifications of the federal asylum law that was enacted by both chambers 
of the Swiss parliament in autumn 2012. This selection is based on two major rationales. First, 
this bill is perfectly balanced in terms of its contents. As will be elaborated later in this section, 
it contained an equal number of tightening and streamlining policies. This provides us with an 
ideal setting for analysing political actors’ preferences about the two asylum policy policies of 
interest. Second, the case at hand was highly politicised. This is primarily attributed to the fact 
that the bill was challenged through a referendum. Since citizens had the final say on this 
package, political elites had a strong incentive to go public with the campaign that preceded the 
vote. This high level of public visibility appears to be of crucial importance for encompassing 
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streamlining reforms. It is only when these rather technical issues are subject to public debates 
that generalists, such as political parties, may begin to form coherent preferences. Otherwise, 
these policies remain the exclusive affair of the specialists and practitioners involved in the 
domain of asylum. Czaika and de Haas (2013, 494) maintain that ‘there is often a considerable 
gap between tough immigration discourses by politicians and actual migration policies, which 
are generally much more nuanced and varied’. Due to its politicisation, the selected case 
presents an opportunity for examining the conscious positioning of a large population of 
political actors towards both tightening and streamlining. It is under such circumstances that 
political conflicts are likely to be waged between political camps, thus opening up the 
possibility for the rise of pronounced cleavages. 
On 28 September 2012, the urgent modifications of the asylum law passed in both 
chambers of Parliament. The parties from the right adopted the bill, while those from the left 
rejected it. Under the leadership of the Greens and several civil society groups, many 
organisations decided to force a vote by collecting the 50,000 signatures required to do so within 
100 days. In January 2013, this ad hoc coalition succeeded in qualifying the urgent 
modifications of the asylum law to the ballot. In addition to the members of the referendum 
committee, the Social Democrats and the Catholic and Protestant Churches recommended the 
rejection of the bill. In contrast, federal and cantonal authorities, parties from the right and some 
conservative citizen groups were in favour of the urgent modifications. On 9 June 2013, Swiss 
voters accepted the bill by a majority of 78.2%. 
When examining the contents of the bill, four policies can be considered to be pursuing 
a tightening objective, while the remaining four pursue a streamlining logic. In regards to the 
former, the ban on applying for asylum at Swiss embassies constituted one of the most debated 
policy. Since Switzerland was the only remaining European country to offer this option, the 
Government pleaded for its abolishment. A second tightening policy denied refugee status for 
deserters. This deterrence measure primarily targeted young Eritrean men, as many of them fled 
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abroad on the grounds that they were forced to perform military service for an undetermined 
period of time. Moreover, the policy allowed for the creation of special centres housing so-
called troublemakers (i.e. asylum seekers who refuse to cooperate with the authorities). Finally, 
Parliament decided to reduce the appeal period for rejected asylum requests. The period 
decreased from 30 to 5 working days for applications that the authorities considered to be 
incredible as well as for feasible deportations. The same reduction was decided for asylum 
seekers originating from a list of defined ‘safe countries’. 
With respect to the streamlining, a first policy concerned the testing of a planned 
structural reform, which aimed to dramatically reduce the average application processing time 
for the majority of cases from an average of 700 days to around 100. To that end, the Swiss 
authorities relied on ‘front-loading’ principle by modelling their reform on the Dutch example. 
In addition, the federal authorities obtained greater powers over the cantons (i.e. the 26 member 
states) in order to enhance their ability to manoeuvre and cope with the challenge posed by 
volatile numbers of asylum seekers. The Confederation was allowed to use its own facilities 
and buildings without requiring cantonal authorization for a maximum period of three years. 
This is a rather controversial issue in the Swiss context, since establishing new asylum centres 
often triggers local protests, not least due to a perceived threat of increased delinquency. In this 
respect, there were concerns that this measure would harm the competences of the cantons. In 
return for this concession, Parliament enacted two policies to benefit the cantons. First, the 
Confederation could provide the affected cantons with flat-rate subsidies for covering 
additional security costs. Second, the amendment stipulated that the federal state could 
financially contribute to employment programs conducted by the cantons, municipalities, or 
third parties. 
 
 
Data collection 
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The empirical analysis draws on data gathered from structured elite interviews. We decided to 
select political organisations that actively took part in the 2013 Swiss referendum campaign on 
the urgent modifications of the federal law on asylum. We identified 31 organisations on the 
basis of various sources: the parliamentary debates, the campaign for the collection of 
signatures, voting recommendations, the press and websites more generally. In addition, to 
complete the set of organisations, this information was cross-referenced using the people that 
were interviewed. Given this pragmatic procedure, we feel confident that we have included the 
most important organisations.2 For each organisation, we scheduled an interview with the 
person responsible for the ballot proposition at stake in the run-up to the campaign. From the 
organisations selected, we decided to remove those that had no impact at all in the direct-
democratic campaign in question. Based on a reputational power indicator, this proved to be 
the case for three organisations, thus leaving us with 28 observations.3  
When applying the criteria described above, we obtain a population of actors that 
strongly resembles that of the network analysis conducted by Statham and Geddes (2006) on 
British migration elites. Indeed the organisations we selected can similarly be assigned to three 
main categories: state actors (N=3), political parties (N=10), and interest groups (N=15). Table 
1 provides an overview of the included organisations. 
                                                            
2 Given that Swiss political elites are motivated to participate in academic interviews, we succeeded in including 
all political organizations we considered to be of importance. We are thus dealing with an exhaustive actor 
selection. 
3 Our measure for power draws on a question asked immediately after the vote had taken place. On a list that 
contained all organisations that we had interviewed in front of the campaign, selected campaign managers were 
invited to mark those organisations that, from their point of view, had been particularly influential. It turned out 
that the Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), the labour union Unia and the conservative youth organisation 
Young4fun.ch were not mentioned at all. Hence, these three organisations were excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 1: Selected political organizations 
Category Subcategory Official name Self-
reported 
positioning 
on the left-
right scale 
(0-10) 
State actors Federal 
administration 
Federal Department of Justice and Police 
(EJPD) 
Federal Office for Migration (BFM) 
5 
 
5 
Sub-national 
administration 
Cantonal Ministers of Justice and Police 
(KKJPD) 
6 
Political parties Left Social Democrats (SP) 
Young Socialists (JUSO) 
Greens (GPS) 
Young Greens (JG) 
2 
1 
2 
2 
Moderate right Christian Democrats (CVP) 
Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) 
Liberals (FDP) 
Green Liberals (GLP) 
5 
6 
7 
5 
Radical right Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
Young Swiss People’s Party (JSVP) 
8 
10 
Civil society 
groups 
Conservative 
groups 
Pro Libertate (ProLib) 
Pikom 
9 
8 
Charities Caritas 
Charity of the Protestant Churches of 
Switzerland (HEKS) 
Swiss Workers Aid (SAH) 
Protestant Social Centre (CSPGE) 
5 
5 
 
1 
2 
Immigrant 
organizations 
Solidarity without frontiers (sosf) 
Coordination against exclusion and 
xenophobia (stop) 
Living together (vivre) 
2 
2 
 
1 
Religious 
organizations  
Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches 
(SEK) 
Justitia et Pax (JusPax) 
AGORA 
5 
 
5 
5 
Human rights 
organizations 
Swiss Democratic Lawyers (DJS) 
Amnesty International (AI) 
3 
5 
Pacifist 
organization 
Group for a Switzerland without an army 
(GSoA) 
1 
 
Our analysis includes three state actors: two bodies of the federal administrations (the Federal 
Department of Justice and Police, and the more specialised Federal Office for Migration) and 
one at the sub-national level (the Cantonal Ministers of Justice and Police). The political parties 
include four from the left (the Social Democrats, the Greens and their respective youth 
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organisations) and the moderate right (Christian Democrats, the Conservative Democratic 
Party, the Liberals and the Green Liberals). In addition, we included the Swiss People’s Party 
and its youth organisation (JSVP) from the radical right. As far as interest groups are concerned, 
all of them can be considered to be civil society actors. This demonstrates that economic interest 
associations (such as business groups and labour unions) tend to keep a low profile in the 
domain of asylum. With the exception of two conservative groups (Pro Libertate, a patriotic 
association, and Pikom, an organisation that campaigns for more restrictive immigration 
policies), civil society groups were against the bill. These interest groups include four charities 
(Caritas, the Charity of the Protestant Churches of Switzerland, Swiss Workers Aid and the 
Geneva-based Protestant Social Centre), three domain-specific organisations that support 
asylum seekers and immigrants (’Solidarity without frontiers’, as well as the two French-
speaking ‘Coordination against exclusion and xenophobia’, and ‘Living together’), three 
religious organisations (the Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches, ‘Justitia et Pax’, a 
Commission of the Conference of Swiss Bishops and AGORA, a pastoral care for refugees in 
Geneva), two human rights organisations (Swiss Democratic Jurists and Amnesty 
International), as well as one pacifist organisation (the ‘Group for a Switzerland without an 
army’). Due to the large representation of civil society groups, the opponents to the ballot 
proposition (N=17) outnumber the supporters (N=11). 
 
Operationalization 
We now present the operationalization of our key variables. In order to measure the dependent 
variables, i.e. the preferences of the selected organisations regarding tightening and 
streamlining policies, we rely on a series of questions about their position on the 2013 ballot 
proposition. To that end, campaign managers were presented with a list of the eight policies at 
stake. These included: 1) the abolishment of the embassy procedure, 2) the new rule on 
desertion, 3) the introduction of special centres for so-called troublemakers, 4) the reduction in 
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the time of the appeal period, 5) the testing of the planned structural reform, 6) the increased 
powers for the federal state over cantons with respect to the use of facilities and buildings, 7) 
the federal flat-rate subsidies for security costs and 8) the federal state’s financial contribution 
for employment programs. Respondents were invited to state the preferences of their respective 
organisation on a five-level-scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
To assess the number of dimensions, we factor-analyse the eight items by using principal 
component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation. Table 2 shows that this procedure retains two 
factors with eigenvalues higher than one. The results are basically in line with our theoretical 
expectations. The first, and stronger, factor reflects the tightening dimension. As expected, the 
items regarding desertion, the procedure at embassies, special centres and the reduction of the 
appeal period highly load on this factor. The second factor comes very close to the notion of 
streamlining. Three of the four remaining items belong to this second dimension, with factor 
loadings respectively higher than 0.7. This applies to the increased federal powers over facilities 
and buildings, the employment programs and the testing of the planned asylum reform. The 
only exception concerns the flat-rate subsidies. This item proves to not be discriminatory in 
nature, as it moderately loads on both factors. To measure the actors’ preferences on tightening 
and streamlining, we extracted the various organisations’ scores on the first and second factor 
loadings. 
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Table 2: Factor loadings of the ballot-specific issue (Principal factor analysis with Varimax 
rotation) 
Issue items Tightening 
(factor 1) 
Streamlining 
(factor 2) 
No guaranteed refugee status for deserters  0.9892 0.0556 
Ban of applying for asylum at embassies 0.9737 0.0872 
Special centres for troublemakers 0.9537 0.1331 
Reduction of appeal period 0.9411 0.0803 
Flat-rate subsidies for security cost 0.5831 0.6165 
Testing of new asylum procedure (Dutch model) 0.4323 0.7245 
More federal power on facilities and buildings 0.0467 0.8072 
Federal contributions to employment programs  -0.1376 0.8070 
   
Eigenvalue 4.6981 1.8105 
Correlation 0.3771 
Number of observations 28 
 
 
We now turn to the two independent variables. Regarding the actors’ position on the left-right 
dimension, we asked respondents to position their respective organisation on a scale that ranges 
from 0 (completely left) to 10 (completely right). The last column in Table 1 shows the self-
reported position of each organisation that is included in this analysis. Regarding the ideological 
extremity, we calculated the amount differences of these self-reported positions from the middle 
category (5). This means that the most extreme actors on either side obtain the maximum values 
of 5, while those in the centre stand at 0.  
 
Empirical results 
To obtain a first impression of the empirical validity of the two hypotheses of interest here, we 
ran bivariate correlations. Both associations turn out to be rather substantial and in line with our 
theoretical expectations. This especially applies to the first hypothesis, where Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient between the left-right positioning and the support of tightening policies 
amounts to 0.77. It appears that support of more restrictive approaches increases the more to 
the right a given political actor places itself. For the second hypothesis, there is a negative 
relation of -0.56 between the extent of ideological extremity and the agreement on streamlining. 
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Thus, more moderate actors tend to be more likely to declare themselves in favour of 
streamlining policies than more extreme organisations. 
Let us now test whether these observed patterns can be confirmed in a multivariate 
setting. Given that we are dealing with a small number of observations (N=28), we decided to 
rely on parsimonious models by limiting ourselves to a few explanatory factors.4 In addition to 
the two dimensions of to the organisations’ core ideology (i.e. left-right and extremity), we 
control for the influence of policy core beliefs, actor types and language region. For the former, 
we take into account the various actors’ degree of xenophobia. To that end, we follow the 
guidance of Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004). We and asked five questions about the 
respondents’ perceived economic, cultural and safety threats due to immigration.5 When 
conducting a factor analysis with varimax rotation of the answers respondents gave on a five-
level Likert scale, we obtain a single factor, which we use as an indicator for the degree of 
xenophobia. 
Regarding actor types, we distinguish between political parties, civil society groups and 
state actors. The state actors are the reference category. As far as language regions are 
concerned, we make use of a dichotomous variable. The four organisations based in the French-
speaking part of Switzerland take the value of ‘1’. We decided to account for language region 
since elite actors of the French language regions tend to hold a more liberal position on 
                                                            
4 This strategy enables an acceptable number of degrees of freedom. In addition, we need to mention that we 
relied on an iterative approach by adding one control variable at a time. These models did not change our 
findings in terms of statistical significance. 
5 The wording of these items is as follows: 1) I am afraid of increased violence and acts of vandalism committed 
by foreigners in my neighborhood, 2) Because of foreigners I am concerned about my personal economic 
situation, 3) I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism committed by foreigners in Switzerland, 4) I am 
afraid of the threat of the Swiss culture due to foreigners, 5) Because of foreigners I am concerned about the 
economic situation of Switzerland. 
23 
immigration-related issues than the rest of the country (Bernhard 2012, 47). Table 3 shows the 
results of two OLS regression models. With respect to tightening (Model I), it turns out that the 
more to the right organisations place themselves, the much more likely they are to be in favour 
of tightening policies. This positive association, which is significant at the 1% error margin, is 
consistent with our theoretical expectation. This also tends to be the case with respect to the 
second hypothesis. As is visible from Model II, there is a negative relationship between the 
degree of ideological extremity and the level of support for streamlining policies. However, this 
statistical association is only secured at the 10% error margin. Thus, there is only weak 
empirical evidence that moderate organisations are more prone to approve streamlining policies 
than more extreme ones. 
Table 3: OLS regression models explaining factor loadings for tightening and streamlining 
 
 Model I Model II 
 Tightening Streamlining 
Left-right 0.229*** 0.029 
 (3.71) (0.30) 
   
Ideological 0.098 -0.203* 
Extremity (1.39) (-1.86) 
   
Xenophobia 0.177 -0.396 
 (1.06) (-1.52) 
   
Parties 0.512** 0.559* 
 (2.46) (1.73) 
   
State actors  1.659*** 0.938* 
 (5.43) (1.97) 
   
French-speaking 0.051 0.078 
Organizations (0.18) (0.19) 
   
Constant -1.565*** -0.039 
 (-4.31) (-0.07) 
N 28 28 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.44 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
T-values in parentheses 
 
Note: Civil society groups are the reference category for the actor types. 
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The results of the control variables are as follows. The degree of xenophobia does not 
systematically affect asylum-specific preferences.6 Regarding actor types, the most consistent 
finding pertains to political parties and state actors. These two groups appear to support both 
streamlining and tightening to a higher extent than civil society groups, which serve as reference 
group in this analysis. However, it is worth noting that the actor-related gap is much more 
pronounced for the tightening (1% error margin) than for the streamlining (10% error margin). 
The fact that organisations from civil society are generally more critical may be attributed to 
their disadvantaged position in the Swiss political system. Unlike state actors and parties, these 
groups typically do not enjoy direct access to the decision-making arena. As a consequence, 
their concerns are less likely to be considered in parliamentary bills. This may in turn nurture a 
higher degree of opposition towards the policies adopted. With respect to language regions, we 
are not able to detect any consistent pattern. More specifically, organisations from the French-
speaking part do no differ themselves from the remaining elite actors when it comes to their 
asylum-specific preferences. 
 
Conclusion 
Confronted with rising numbers of asylum requests, numerous European countries have since 
the 2010s enacted streamlining reforms, which refer to encompassing efficiency-enhancing 
policies that are designed to enhance the efficiency of national asylum systems through 
procedural accelerations and structural reforms. In this article, we have argued that the 
academic literature has neglected these policies so far. By relying on structured elite interviews 
about the urgent modifications to the Swiss asylum law, we have been able to show that the 
conflict structures over these two major reform trends follow entirely different logics. Actor 
                                                            
6 With respect to tightening, this noteworthy non-finding is primarily due to the fact that the explanatory power 
of the left-right scale tends to outweigh the effects that stem from xenophobic attitudes. 
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preferences for tightening policies are strongly influenced by their ideological positioning on 
the left-right axis. The level of support for these policies generally increases the more to the 
right a given political organisation position itself. In contrast, the degree of approval for 
streamlining policies tends to be higher the more to the centre political actors position 
themselves on this scale. This quantitative analysis showed that the statistical associations attain 
far higher levels of significance for the well-established conflict on tightening policies than for 
those that refer to streamlining. 
The main findings of this empirical contribution suggest that the composition of reform 
coalitions highly depends on the issue at stake. Tightening policies are clearly favoured by the 
radical right and opposed by the left and its civil society allies. The remaining actors usually 
take intermediate positions. Due to their pivotal role in most political systems in Western 
Europe, the moderate right may hold the balance of power when it comes to enacting more 
restrictive policies. In cases in which the moderate right lacks a parliamentary majority, such 
reforms may come about on the basis of agreements with the radical right. In contrast, 
streamlining reforms may typically be the result of coalitions between moderate and pragmatic 
forces from the left and the right, given that more radical actors on either side of the class 
conflict have been found to be rather reluctant to support such policies.  
More generally, the two-dimensional setting proposed here may provide a more accurate picture 
in terms of actor configurations. By combining the preferences of tightening and streamlining 
policies, we can speculate about the existence of four distinctive types of political organisations 
in Western Europe in relation to asylum issues. Although moderate right actors may be 
somewhat hesitant about applying more restrictiveness to the asylum system, they may usually 
be in favour of both tightening and streamlining. In contrast, actors from the radical left may 
reject both approaches. The radical right may endorse tightening and be sceptical about 
streamlining endeavours. The opposite may hold true for pragmatic actors from the left. Even 
though future research will have to clarify how, and to what extent, streamlining reforms create 
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a division among both the left and the right, it seems obvious that a more nuanced 
conceptualisation has the potential to more adequately reflect actors’ preferred policy outcomes 
than is the case for a single policy dimension. In a similar vein, Bale (2008, 463) maintained 
that moderate right parties are more than capable of thinking, talking and acting for themselves, 
even though they may be under pressure from the radical right on immigration issues. A similar 
logic of differentiation may be applicable to the left. At a minimum, our empirical analysis 
concludes that the moderate left is much more prone to embarking on streamlining reforms on 
asylum matters than those from the radical left. However, when it comes tightening, these two 
ideological groups have been shown to hold similar views. 
Despite that fact that this empirical analysis reveals some promising findings, there are 
a number of reasons they should be considered with care. First, the empirical case used here 
only deals with one case of reform. While the selected reform case had the crucial advantage 
of being perfectly balanced (it contained as many tightening as streamlining policies), these 
results have to be taken with a pinch of salt when it comes to the issue of generalisability. It 
remains to be seen whether such empirical patterns are observable beyond the specific context 
studied here. Because the urgent modifications of the Swiss asylum law were subject to a 
referendum campaign, the preferences of political actors regarding streamlining policies may 
have been much more crystallised in this study than would have been the case in instances of 
low saliency. In other words, we posit that our results are only valid for situations when both 
tightening and streamlining policies are well established among political elites. However, given 
that both the topic of asylum in general, and streamlining reforms in particular, are increasingly 
high on the agenda in these times of record high asylum applications, we anticipate that this 
may be the case all over Europe in the near future. Hence, we would like to plead for studies 
that comparatively examine the various forms and effects of streamlining asylum policies across 
countries. 
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